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An Asymmetric Watermarking Method
T. Furon∗ and P. Duhamel
Abstract
This article presents an asymmetric watermarking method as an alternative to classical Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum and
Watermarking Costa Schemes techniques. This new method provides a higher security level against malicious attacks threatening
watermarking techniques used for a copy protection purpose. This application, which is quite different from the classical copyright
enforcement issue, is extremely challenging as no public algorithm is so far known to be secure enough and some proposed
proprietary techniques have been already hacked. Our method is thus a try towards the proof that the Kerckhoffs principle can
be stated in the copy protection framework.
Index Terms
Copy protection system, watermarking, security, asymmetric methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
D IGITAL watermarking is the art of hiding information in digital contents such as images, audio clips and videos. Thisart is useful in many various applications, but this paper only deals with the copy protection scenario. Although the role
of the watermark is very simple in this application, some particular constraints render the subject extremely challenging. The
main concern is the assessment of a security level according to the Kerckhoffs principle.
A. A challenge for the watermarking community
To build a copy protection system for consumer electronic devices, we are looking for a technique, which could hide in an
original content a signal commonly called watermark. Compliant devices such as players or recorders are able to detect the
presence of this watermark. In this particular case, its presence means that the content is protected and, hence, it is illegal to
copy it. Watermarking is used as a mean to distinguish personal or copy-free data from protected copyrighted contents. Real
world copy protection systems are indeed more complex, but this simple description brings enough severe issues. The technical
requirements are well known for this kind of application in the watermarking community:
• No perceptual distortion. Watermarking should not spoil the entertainment of the contents.
• One bit payload. Detectors only check for a presence of a watermark.
• Robustness to common content processing like coarser source coding, D/A + A/D transformation, low pass filtering. . .
• Low complexity of the detection algorithm.
• Relative security.
The fifth criterion must be detailed. What is the difference between security and robustness? In one hand, robustness measures
the impact on the detection capability of common transformations applied non-intentionally or intentionally to the protected
contents. If intentional, they are qualified as blind attacks because it is a hopeless attempt from the pirates to remove the
watermark. They know nothing about watermarking and they hope such transformations could remove its protection. On the
other hand, security measures the impact on the detection capability of intentional processing dedicated to a certain class
of watermarking techniques. They are sometimes called malicious attacks in the sense that the pirates know perfectly the
watermark embedding and detection algorithms and they seek for flaws in this targeted technique.
This criterion is somewhat subjective. For instance, the motto of the CPTWG1, one of the first industrial forums dealing with
copy protection system, is ‘Keep Honest People Honest’. It means that the watermarking technique doesn’t provide a high level
of security. Its hack must not be obvious so that it stays out of the reach of ‘honest people’. Nevertheless, another industrial
forum, the SDMI2, was more concerned about security as this requirement clearly appeared in the call for proposal. The
rationale under this concern might be the following scenario: imagine a well experimented pirate has disclosed a reproducible
hack ; he has implemented it in a user friendly software, and he distributes it on the Internet, so that, now, removing watermark
is on the reach of a mouse click for the not so ‘honest people’.
SDMI has launched a challenge to evaluate four proposed audio watermarking techniques. The watermarking community
performed very well as, at least, two research teams broke all proposed techniques [1], [2]. It shows that some companies have
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proposed solutions with no assessment of their security level. These techniques were robust but not secure. They though that
their algorithms would be kept secret so that the pirates would have no clue to hack them. This rationale is called ‘Secrecy
by Obscurity’. The SDMI hacks revealed that this motto may lead to very hazardous solutions. But, pulling down techniques
and pointing out possible flaws is not the only role of the academic community. It has to prove whether better solutions are
achievable or not.
B. Kerckhoffs principle
Cryptography is an old science compared to watermarking. An impressive amount of works has been done in this field to
clarify the basic concepts, primitives and proofs of a security level. The same tasks have to be done in watermarking.
The fundamental basement of cryptography has been established in 1874 by A. Kerckhoffs [3]. He stated that the designer
of a crypto-system must suppose that the opponent knows his algorithms in details except a parameter called the secret key.
Hence, the security of the crypto-system must only stem from storing the secret key in a safe place, the rest of the system
being public. The Kerckhoffs principle is a heuristic defended by two facts:
• There are proprietary algorithms (i.e. violating the Kerckhoffs principle) that have been hacked. The book [4] gives
numerous examples. The most famous is the hack of the Enigma encryption machine during the Second World War.
• There are public encryption algorithms still unbroken (e.g. RSA, DES).
Our work is only motivated by this simple question: Is the Kerckhoffs principle a valid concept in watermarking for copy
protection? The episode of the SDMI challenge illustrates the first item towards a positive answer. But, watermarking is too
young a science to get any assessment of the second item. So far, there is no public and secure watermarking algorithm for
the copy protection application.
The issue about the validity of this principle is extremely important. Let us analyse the two alternatives:
• The Kerckhoffs principle is not valid. Every watermarking technique will be developed in secrecy. The academic research
on this topic and its publications, conferences, is no more justified. Patenting new techniques is also no more possible.
As no public study about security assessment is available, nobody can compare or trust the proposed techniques. In
cryptography, one always claims that no algorithm can be kept secret during more than two years in the consumer
electronic industry. These watermarking techniques are then likely to be hacked periodically.
• The Kerckhoffs principle is valid. This gives credits to the academic research. This community can analyse techniques
to assess their security level. These results are public. It shares more and more experiences so that the security level
increases. Industries will then launch a fair and reliable business once the techniques are mature.
The watermarking community is about to approve this fundamental principle for some applications. For instance, steganog-
raphy is an application where, thanks to works from Cachin, one knows how to measure a security level [5], the stego-system
being public. In the same way, the community has made a lot of improvements in copyright protection: some malicious attacks
(e.g. the deadlock problem [6], the ‘copy attack’ [7]) have been spotted and counter attacks have been proposed. It seems that,
in the copy protection application, this ‘attacks / counter attacks’ virtuous mechanism is not engaged due to the ‘Secrecy by
Obscurity’ argument.
This article aims to propose an alternative solution to the classical watermarking schemes. This stronger solution would
argue for the use of the Kerckhoffs principle for copy protection applications. The document is structured as follows. A brief
overview of the watermarking processes introduces the basic notation. It is followed by a threat analysis in the copy protection
framework in section II. Asymmetric schemes are presented as a counter-attack to the spotted threats. We describe in section III
one of these methods and especially its unusual detection algorithm whose design requires some skills in testing hypothesis in
spectral analysis. The security level provided by this asymmetric method is assessed in section IV. The simulations of section
V confirm the previous analysis.
II. CONVENTIONAL WATERMARKING
This section details two different watermarking methods. Assuming that they fulfil the robustness and perceptibility con-
straints, attention is focused on the security criterion in the context of copy protection.
A. Notation
We set in this paragraph the usual structure of the watermarking scheme. It is described with the notation of [8], [9].
The goal of the embedding algorithm is to select the most important perceptual features of the covert content and to add a
very small amount of watermark energy to each of them. From a cover content Co belonging to the ‘media space’, an extraction
function X(.) maps the cover data into a feature vector of the ‘watermark space’: ro = X(Co). Denote N the length of this
extracted vector. The role of the embedding process is to modify ro into a vector rw belonging to the critical region R
of the ‘watermark space’. This region is composed with extracted vectors considered as watermarked by the detector. The
modification is performed by the ‘mixing function’ F (.), which mixes the desired watermark signal with the extracted vector:
rw = F (ro,w). The ‘inverse extraction’ function Y (.) finishes the embedding process. It maps back from the ‘watermark
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space’ to the ‘media space’: Cw = Y (rw, Co). This modification is made under the constraint that the resulting watermarked
content Cw is perceptually close to Co.
The detection process gets an unknown received content Cu. It extracts the vector ru = X(Cu) and checks whether
it belongs to critical region R. Let denote H0 the hypothesis when the received content is not watermarked and H1 the
alternative hypothesis. The detection is a decision rule whose output Ď(ru) equals 1 if Cu is considered as watermarked and
0 else. Usually, this hard decision is the comparison of the likelihood function D(ru) with a positive threshold.
Ď(ru) =
{
1 if D(ru) > T
0 else
(1)
The performance of the detection is measured by the probability of false alarm Pfa which is the probability that the detector
claims a received content is protected whereas it was not watermarked, and the power of the test Pde which is the probability
that the detector correctly detects a watermarked content. They are mathematically defined by Pfa = P (Ď(ru) = 1|H0) =
E{Ď(ru)|H0} and Pde = P (Ď(ru) = 1|H1) = E{Ď(ru)|H1}, where E{x} is the mathematical expectation of random
variable x.
The benefit of this model is that we tackle the contents as vectors of length N . Moreover, we assume that the vectors represent
central stationary random processes whose autocorrelation functions are absolutely summable. In the simplest assumptions,
vector ro is modelled as central Gaussian white noise of variance σ
2
ro
.
B. Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) is a modulation by a pseudo-random carrier, invented during the World War II
[10]. The term “spread” comes from the fact that the information to transmit (here in this article, the presence of a watermark)
has been embedded into a huge number of features. Hence, if the pirate succeeds to remove the watermark for some selected
coefficients, there is enough energy left in the other features to detect the watermark. The carrier is generated by a pseudo
random generator seeded with a secret key, as usually done in military digital communications. It provides the following
well-known qualities [11]:
• The presence of the transmitted signal is hidden (low interception ). This helps to respect the perceptual constraint.
• The ability to fight against interferences due to intentional scrambling, to other communications or to selective channels
(e.g. multi-path channels). This brings robustness and it helps to fight against collusion attacks.
• Security is ensured as soon as the pseudo-random carrier is kept secret. Receivers ignoring this carrier can neither decode
the message, nor change it. Jamming the communications then needs far more power.
These properties explain the success of the DSSS modulation in the watermarking community. This article clearly focuses on
this technique as we hide one bit of information (presence or absence of watermark), through the embedding a long pseudo
random sequence in the content.
Mathematically, the ‘mixing function’ is the addition of the original extracted vector with a normalised pseudo random
sequence w, as defined in Eq. (2), where gain g fixes the watermark strength, linked to a relative watermark to original content
power ratio: G = g
2
σ2
ro
.
rw = ro + gw. (2)
At the detection side, the likelihood function is usually defined by the linear correlation of Eq. (3), which is the optimal tested
statistic following the Neyman-Pearson strategy, if ro is a white Gaussian vector..
D(ru) = ru
T w (3)
The tested statistic D(ru) being then Gaussian distributed, its pdf is fully described by its mean and the variance (µHi , σ
2
Hi
)
under hypothesis Hi, whose value are known to be
µH0 = 0 µH1 = gN (4)
σ2H0 = σ
2
H1
= Nσ2ro . (5)
Noting Q(.) the cumulative distribution function of N (0, 1), the following relations between Pfa, Pde and T easily come:
T = T (Pfa) = µH0 + σH0Q
−1(1 − Pfa) (6)
Pde = Pde(Pfa) = 1 − Q
(
σH0
σH1
Q−1(1 − Pfa) −
µH1 − µH0
σH1
)
(7)
Pde is an increasing function of the deflection coefficient ǫ = (µH1 − µH0)/σH1 , equaling ǫDSSS =
√
GN in the DSSS case:
Pde,DSSS = 1 − Q
(
Q−1(1 − Pfa) −
√
GN
)
(8)
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C. Threat Analysis of DSSS
The watermark signal w clearly appears in the detection process. If one knows this signal, one can easily change rw to
forge a pirated content Cp. For instance, a pirate is sure that the following action will fool the detection process as it sets the
correlation of Eq. (3) to zero, deluding the detector:
rp = X(Cp) = rw − (rwT .w)w (9)
This is the reason why w must remain secret.
The impact of the discovery of w depends on the application. For copyright protection systems, it is likely that this secret
vector, presumably issued by a trusted registration party is different for each content. Hence, the knowledge of one signal w
only helps the pirates to forge one illegal content. But, for the copy protection framework, this knowledge may pull down the
whole system: As explained below, all protected contents are watermarked with a unique vector w.
The main issue of our security analysis is to know whether w can remain secret in the copy protection framework. Here is
a list of possible threats issued from [12], [13]:
To average a huge amount of protected content: Due to a low cost constraint, the memory and computing power available
at the detection side for extracting the vectors and calculating the correlation is very small. Hence, the secret vector is not
very long. Due to the perceptual constraint, the watermark to content power ratio is very low. In many real-world techniques,
the watermark signal is then tiled (i.e. repeated) all along the content. At the detection side, an average process increases the
power ratio and consequently the efficiency of the test. This results in the fact that all protected contents are watermarked
with the same secret, and moreover, each of them contains it several times. As the ‘mixing function’ is often linear or nearly
linear, an average of O(G−1) extracted vectors of independent protected contents gives an accurate estimation of this secret.
To make a comparison with cryptography and its ciphertext only attack [14], this average attack belongs to a strategy called
watermarked content only attack.
To defeat the embedding process: Designers of watermarking technique must be careful that their embedder is not leaking
some information about the secret, while it watermarks special contents. For instance, watermarking uniform (or smooth
gradient) areas of pictures is not a good idea from a perceptual point of view. But, it is also a real security threat: Pirates will
easily isolate the components coming from the watermark signal. Another big issue is to watermark contents that have already
been publicly disclosed. We can think of the following scenario: The content owners prefer to watermark their contents just
before they are pressed on DVD or broadcast on the air. Trailers released several months ago when the movie was on screen,
could be a source of the cover contents. Making a difference, in the ‘watermark space’, between watermarked vectors rw and
their corresponding original vector ro gives pirates a lot of information about the secret signal. Virtually, one pair of content
is enough to reveal the secret sequence. This is a known cover content attack (in comparison to the cryptographic known
plaintext attack [14]).
To analyse the behaviour of the detector: I. Cox and J.P. Linnartz pointed out that the pirates are able to estimate the secret
vector just observing how the chip behaves for a given number of faked chosen contents [12]. Although dishonest users have
only access to the binary decision (i.e. the content is watermarked or not), the detection output leaks sufficiently information
about the secret key to achieve its accurate estimation. This attack takes O(N) tries as proved by T. Kalker [15]. We call it
the oracle attack.
To steal the secret by reverse engineering: The secret is located in all embedders and detectors. The embedders are not
publicly available. They are placed in the preparation stage of the contents, e.g. in the movies studio. We assumed that this
place is safe from secret leakage. In the copy protection framework, this assumption does not hold for the detectors, since they
will be implemented in hardware and placed in consumer electronic devices (e.g. DVD recorder). The reverse engineering of
these devices is a real threat because tamper-proof hardware might be too expensive for the consumer electronic industry.
The reader not versed in security might be doubtful about these threats. There are numerous news about reverse engineering
of security functions: game station (copy protection ‘mod’ chip), DVD players (dezoning, encryption hack [16]), mobile
phone (authentication breaks), set top boxes (conditional access hacks). Indeed, no security can be provided if a safe place
where keys are stored does not exist. In this article, we do not address the issue of how to avoid reverse engineering in
hardware implementations, and we assume it is possible to do so. The other threats are somewhat more theoretical because no
watermarking technique has been really deployed up to now. But, the SDMI challenge and its hacks provide us a good idea
of the power of these ‘signal processing’ hacks [1], [2].
We discard in this article attacks like desynchronisation via geometric transformations (still images) or sample frequency
wobbling of audio contents because they belongs more to the robustness issue which should be tackled by the design of the
extraction function. Watermarking technique will be more and more robust against these blind attacks. Forged contents’ quality
will be lower and lower, so that, the pirates will give up this strategy, preferring the use of more powerful malicious attacks.
Whereas robustness was so far the weak point focusing all the research efforts, the improvements achieved recently let us
foresee that security will be the main issue in the future.
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D. Watermarking Costa’s Schemes
Watermarking Costa’s Schemes (WCS) constitutes another class of extremely popular watermarking processes based on
Costa’s article [17]. A partition divides a constellation U of LU independent reference vectors called codewords into LM
disjoint codebooks: U = ⋃m∈M Um. Each codebook is associated with a symbol to be transmitted. This allows transmitting
one out of LM symbols per cover content. The mixing function acts like an attraction where the extracted vector is pushed
towards the nearest codeword belonging to the codebook Um associated with the symbol m to be transmitted. This codeword
is denoted q(ro,m) as it is the quantization of ro on the codebook Um.
rw = ro + α(q(ro,m) − ro) (10)
The detection finds the closest codeword to the received vector. The decoded symbol m̂ is the index of the codebook, which
this codeword belongs to. The reader can find more explanations on possible constructions of the codebooks, partitions and
performances in [18], [19], [20].
Eq. (10) clearly shows that the watermark signal is created with the knowledge of the original extracted vector. This is called
the side-information at the embedding stage and it yields schemes achieving (capacity / robustness against additive noise) char-
acteristics far better than the ones resulting from DSSS. Side-information is absolutely recommended for applications requiring
a large capacity where the additive noise attack model is suitable like steganography, copyright protection, fingerprinting or
content integrity verification.
Yet, no work has been done about the application of such methods to copy protection. A priori, Costa’s idea is not suitable
as it efficiently decodes hidden messages in watermarked contents (that are structured in distinct ways at the embedding stage),
whereas it is not designed to detect watermarked from original contents that are not at all structured. Only two research works
tackle this issue.
The first idea is based on hard decision decoding [21]. A decoder fed with an original content retrieves a random message
depending on the nearest codeword to ro. These random messages are assumed to be uniformly distributed: P (m̂ = m|H0) =
L−1M ∀m ∈ M. Then, one protects the contents hiding the message m0. Hence, the test hypotheses becomes H0 : m̂ 6= m0
vs. H1 : m̂ = m0. Under hypothesis H0, the relation Pfa = P (m̂ = m0|H0) = L−1M sets the size of the alphabet. Under
hypothesis H1, the use of channel codes studied in [20] improves power of the test Pde at a given watermark to noise power
ratio.
The second idea is based on soft information, where the goal is to produce a measure of reliability of the decoding process.
Knowing the embedded symbol m0, the pdf of the original and the watermarked vectors are significantly different so that a
test based on likelihood is relevant: D(ru) = p(ru|H1,m0)/p(ru|H0). Performances are given in [20].
But, as these methods rely on quantization on codebooks, their Achilles’ knee is the amplitude scaling and offset attack.
The critical region is a set of small cells centred on the codewords of Um0 . The watermarked vector can easily go out of
the sphere by a change of amplitude. This imposes first to recover the equivalently scaled and offset constellation observing
possibly noisy version of watermarked vectors before being able to measure the likelihood. An estimation algorithm of scaled
and offset codebooks for Scalar Costa Scheme (SCS) is proposed in [20]. Note that DSSS is inherently more robust to these
attacks as its critical region is compact and in one piece.
E. Threat Analysis of WCS
Although no work is reported on the application of WCS to the copy protection framework, it seems possible to do so
regarding its detectability and robustness. Its security in this framework is now analysed.
Let analyse the watermarked content only attack. Dithered Modulation (DM), Quantized Index Modulation (QIM) and
SCS are competitive practical implementations of WCS where the constellation is structured as the product, component by
component, of a uniform scalar quantizer: U = ∆ZN . It is believed that a secret dithering vector k would ‘secure’ DM, QIM
and SCS such that U = ∆ZN +k is now a secret constellation. In the copy protection framework, there is only one instance of
parameters ∆ and k embedded in all consumer electronics devices. The challenge for pirates is to estimate the codebook Um0
(whence the critical region) observing watermarked vectors. This is exactly the goal of the estimation method we mentioned
above! The dishonest users proceed it on almost noiseless vectors coming from good quality watermarked contents, whereas the
detector runs the same algorithm on possibly heavily attacked contents. Referring to [20], in this condition, O(250) watermarked
contents are necessary to estimate ∆ and k within 1% of relative error. Once the codebook is discovered, the pirates forge
good quality pirated contents thanks to, for instance, an inverse SCS algorithm with reduced distortion also available in [20].
Things are slightly easier with a known cover content attack. Moreover, according to M. Mansour and A. Tewfik, an oracle
attack is also possible against WCS [22]. Up to now, the actual practical implementations of WCS are not designed for the
copy protection scenario. It is technically possible to adapt them to such a context where they will achieve better performances
than DSSS. Yet, they do not provide better security levels than DSSS.
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F. Conclusion
Section II sets the basic notation and it makes an account of two widely used watermarking methods. We explain the reasons
why attacks based on reverse engineering and on desynchronisation are discarded in this article. The main analysis focuses on
three attacks that are typical from the copy protection scenario. It turns out that the classical watermarking methods give low
security levels in this context.
III. ASYMMETRIC WATERMARKING METHODS
F. Hartung and B. Girod’s article is the very first paper to introduce the notion of public-key (and thus asymmetric)
watermarking [23]. Although the proposed solution was not at all secure, it stressed the issue that the would-be secret key
of DSSS can not remain a secret in some applications. Recently, new asymmetric watermarking schemes have been proposed
as an interesting alternative especially for the copy protection framework [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29]. Although invented
independently, the authors showed that these methods shared the same detection algorithm (i.e. the correlation is replaced by
a quadratic form), and that they have similar performances [30]. The only exception is the work from and J. Picard and A.
Robert based on neural networks [31]. Moreover, we would like to point out the very interesting work from L. Gomes and al.
who improved our scheme so that decoding of hidden messages and not only detection of a watermark signal is achieved [32].
The concept of asymmetry must be understood as a method and not as a complete technique. This method is based on
the same breakdown structure explained in section II-A. The only changes are the way watermark signals are created and
the definition of the critical region, i.e. the decision rule. This allows us to derive an asymmetric version from any classical
watermarking techniques. The article [33] is the implementation of an asymmetric method to the well-known Boney Tewfik
audio watermarking technique [34]. The article [35] is the performances comparison of an extremely robust still images
watermarking technique [36] and its asymmetric version.
A. The basic idea: randomized embedding
In the classical watermarking methods described in II, the creation of the watermark signal is deterministic. In DSSS, w
plays the role of the secret key, hence it is constant in the copy protection framework. In WCS, w is a fixed function of ro
given by Eq. (10). The main idea of asymmetric methods is to transform the watermark embedding into a random processing.
The watermark signal depends on a secret key and on a random variable. Hence, two watermarked versions of the same original
content are different as the random variable changes each time the embedding is run.
This idea is not new in security. This kind of variable is called a random in cryptography. Goldwasser-Micali, El Gamal,
Blum-Goldwasser encryptions are examples of such probabilistic encryption schemes [37]. The random is here to cast a given
property of the signals emitted by the embedding stage without revealing their exact nature.
The challenge resides on how to enforce an idea coming from cryptography in the signal processing field. The difficulty
is that the detector ignores the random used at the embedding stage. It only knows the secret key, whence the asymmetry
between the embedding and the detection. The detector can not check whether a precise signal has been hidden in the content.
It must detect presence of watermark signals without knowing their exact values. The technical solution found so far by
watermarkers cited above is to use second order statistics. The detector verifies whether the received content has a particular
statistical property (related to a secret key) which is due to the presence of a random watermark signal. This property can
not be expected from usual original contents. The way we implemented this idea in our method is described in the following
subsection.
B. Example of an asymmetric method
The creation of watermark signals is as sketched in Fig. 1. First, a pseudo-random generator fed by the random gives a
white Gaussian noise v with variance unity. This signal goes through a filter h whose frequency response module matches
with a given spectrum’s template |H(f)|2. The filter is normalised so that
∫ 0.5
−0.5
|H(f)|2 df = 1. The resulting coloured noise
is interleaved by a pseudo-random permutation ̟ of the vectors indexes to give the final watermark signal.
w = ̟(h ⊗ v) (11)
⊗ is the convolution product. Finally, this watermark sequence w will be embedded into sequence ro thanks to the ‘mixing
function’ F (.) of Eq. (2) and the ‘inverse extraction function’ Y (.) concludes the watermarking process. Compared to DSSS,
the embedding process remains unchanged except the creation of the sequence w.
The detection process first extracts a received vector ru = X(Cu) which goes through the de-interleaver r̃u = ̟
−1(ru).
This vector is then a mix of the interleaved extracted vector coming from the cover content and, if the received content is
watermarked, a coloured noise whose spectrum is shaped like |H(f)|2. The permutation is assumed to have a perfect whitening
action. The detection does not know the watermark signal but only the de-interleaver and the spectrum’s template.
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Fig. 2. The watermark detection process.
C. Testing hypothesis
The goal of this subsection is to define the decision rule for this asymmetric method. The structure of the detector is sketched
in Fig.III-C.
1) Simple hypothesis test: It is extremely difficult to define a cost when the detector takes wrong decisions, so that Bayes
or minimax strategies are not really suited for our purpose. Yet, the usual constraint on the detection (see SDMI or CPTWG
calls for proposal) is to fix an upper level ω of the probability of false alarms Pfa This clearly references to a Neyman-Pearson
test, which is the most powerful among all the tests with respect to the constraint Pfa < ω [38]. It is based on the comparison
of the log likelihood ratio (or any monotone function of the likelihood ratio) to a threshold, so that the decision rule is defined
by Eq. (12).
Ď(ru) =
{
1 if log p(fru|H1)p(fru|H0) > T (ω)
0 else
(12)
The threshold T (ω) is chosen such that Pfa = E{Ď(ru)|H0} < ω.
The main difficulty now is to measure the log-likelihood under each hypothesis. According to the above simple assumptions,
r̃u is a central Gaussian vector of length N , so that:
log p(r̃u|Hi) = −
1
2
(
N log 2π + log det(Ri) + r̃u
′
R−1i r̃u
)
i ∈ {0, 1} (13)
where Ri is the covariance matrix of r̃u under the hypothesis Hi. For i = 0, r̃u is a white noise, hence, R0 = σ
2
ru
IN . Yet,
for i = 1, the calculus of det(R1) and of R
−1
1 are really cumbersome, even for simple expressions of the filter h.
2) Principal part of the likelihood: Since the likelihood function is often used in parameters estimation or in hypothesis
tests, many works have been done in order to render its use more practical. Whittle suggested to overcome the above-mentioned
difficulty by replacing the log likelihood by its principal part L̂N (r|Hi), which satisfies Eq. (14).
L̂N (r|Hi) − log p(r|Hi)√
N
→ 0 as N → ∞ (conv. in prob.) (14)
The expression of L̂N (r|Hi) is simpler than the log likelihood’s one, and at the same time, estimators and hypothesis tests
based on principal parts ratio are proved to be asymptotically equivalent to those based ons log likelihood ratios.
Theorem 1 (Whittle): Let the expected power spectral density Si under hypothesis Hi and the corresponding covariance
function Ri of a stationary random process r satisfy the following conditions: ∃η > 0 | Si(f) ≥ η ∀f ∈ (− 12 , 12 ] and∑∞
k=1 k |Ri(k)|
2
< ∞
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Then relation (14) holds for
L̂N (r|Hi) = −
N
2
(
log 2π +
∫ 1
2
− 12
log Si(f)df +
∫ 1
2
− 12
IN (f)
Si(f)
df
)
(15)
with IN (f) =
1
N
∣∣∣∣∣
N−1∑
k=0
r[k]e2πkf
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(16)
IN (f) is the periodogram of the vector r.
For practical use, the integral forms in Eq. (15) are replaced by their Riemann sums sampled at the Fourier frequencies
f = (1/N, . . . , N̄/N)T with N̄ = N/2 − 1. N is a power of 2 to speed up the periodogram ordinates calculus. This stems
in a new interpretation of the Whittle’s approximation. Let us recall that the random variables {IN (f [k])} are distributed as a
central χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom with expectation Si(f [k]) and variance S
2
i (f [k]):
pIN (f [k])(x) =
1
Si(f [k])
e
− x
Si(f[k]) ∀x ∈ [0,∞) (17)
Moreover, if the components of r are Gaussian distributed, then the periodograms sampled at Fourier frequencies are
independent.
E
{
N−1∑
k=0
r[k]e2πf [a]k.
N−1∑
l=0
r[l]e2πf [b]l
}
= 0 for f [a] 6= f [b] (18)
Eq.(18) implies the non-correlation of random variables {∑N−1l=0 r[l]e2πf [k]l}, hence independence in the Gaussian case. Let
us consider the vector i = (IN (f [1]), . . . , IN (f [N̄ ]))
T . Its log likelihood under hypothesis Hi is the sum of the components’
log likelihood thanks to their independence:
log p(i|Hi) = −
N̄∑
k=1
log Si(f [k]) +
IN (f [k])
Si(f [k])
(19)
3) Final decision rule: Finally the decision rule is expressed in Eq. (20).
Ď(ru) =
{
1 if D(i) > T (ω)
0 else
(20)
where D(i) is the tested statistic, whose expression is
D(i) =
N̄∑
k=1
IN (f [k])
(
S1(f [k]) − S0(f [k])
S1(f [k])S0(f [k])
)
+
n∑
k=1
log
S0(f [k])
S1(f [k])
(21)
The threshold T (ω) is estimated applying the Neyman-Pearson strategy with respect to the statistic D(i). This statistic is
distributed as a χ2 with N −2 degrees of freedom. For large N , we assume it is a normal distribution invoking the central limit
theorem so that T (ω) is calculated replacing Pfa by ω in Eq. (6). the mean and the variance under hypothesis Hi i ∈ {0, 1},
are as follows:
µHi =
N̄∑
k=1
Si(f [k])
(
S1(f [k]) − S0(f [k])
S1(f [k])S0(f [k])
)
+
n∑
k=1
log
S0(f [k])
S1(f [k])
(22)
σ2Hi =
N̄∑
k=1
S2i (f [k])
(
S1(f [k]) − S0(f [k])
S1(f [k])S0(f [k])
)2
(23)
We still have to estimate the power spectrum density under both hypotheses Hi.
• H0: r̃u = r̃o which is a white noise. Hence, S0(f [k]) = σ
2
ro
.
• H1: r̃u = r̃o + g(h ⊗ v) where v is a random process independent from ro. Hence, S1(f [k]) = σ2ro + g2|H(f [k])|2.
Moreover, the power of the marked vector is σ2ru = σ
2
ro + g
2.
Finally, the tested variable is:
D(i) =
N̄∑
k=1
(
IN (f [k])
σ2ru
g2(|H(f [k])|2 − 1)
σ2ru + g
2(|H(f [k])|2 − 1) + log
σ2ru
σ2ru + g
2(|H(f [k])|2 − 1)
)
(24)
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4) Power of the test: Interesting performances are the receiver operating characteristic Pde = Pde(Pfa) plotted for a
fixed G and the power function Pde = Pde(G) plotted for a fixed level of false alarm ω. These curves help comparing
different tests. When the sufficient statistic is Gaussian distributed, the power function is given by Eq. (7). To explicit how Pde
depends on N and Pfa, we insert the expressions of the expected spectrum of III-C.3 in Eq. (22) and (23). Then, a Taylor
development of the deflection coefficient ǫ and the ratio σH0/σH1 is made with respect to the variable G ≪ 1. To estimate the
behaviour of this expressions as N goes large, we assume that the Riemann sums converge to their corresponding integrals,
i.e. N−1
∑N
k=1 . . . =
∫ 1
0
. . . df . Here are the results:
ǫ = G
√√√√N
2
∫ 1
2
− 12
|H(f)|4df + o(G
√
N) (25)
σH1
σH0
= 1 − G
∫ 1
2
− 12
|H(f)|6df
∫ 1
2
− 12
|H(f)|4df
+ o(G) (26)
The main conclusion is that the deflection coefficient ǫ is nearly proportional to G
√
N which is lower than ǫDSSS in Eq. (8).
Asymmetric detectors are thus less efficient than DSSS ones by a factor
√
G < 1. As G is a parameter fixed by the perceptual
constraint, the only way to face this inconvenient is to increase the length of the extracted vectors. Usually, G ∼ −20dB so
that the vectors of an asymmetric scheme should be 10 times longer to reach the same efficiency than DSSS schemes.
Another strategy is to tile the same watermark signal in order to artificially increase the ratio G by an average process at
the detection stage. In order to fairly analyse the gain of this tiling, we fix the total length of the embedded signals: w is now
of length N ′ = N/τ but repeated τ times. The decision rule works on the vector ru
′:
ru
′ =
1
τ
τ−1∑
i=0
ru
i =
1
τ
τ−1∑
i=0
ro
i + gw = ro
′ + gw (27)
The power σ2r′o is τ times lower than σ
2
ro , if we assume the averaged vectors are independent. Then, the new deflection
coefficient of the asymmetric scheme is:
ǫ′ = G′
√
N ′ = G
√
Nτ =
√
τǫ (28)
One notices that tiling does not increase the deflection coefficient of DSSS scheme: ǫ′DSSS = ǫDSSS . In this case, the tiling
only reduces the complexity of the correlation-based detection. Yet, the tiling has also some drawbacks. It compromises the
assumption N → ∞ used to build our decision rule. Moreover, it could introduce a security flaw in our scheme, as explained
in section IV.
D. Asymmetric methods in the real world
We have made simple assumptions to properly study the structure of the test and its performances. These assumptions are
not always realistic. This subsection focuses on changes implied by the practical use of asymmetric schemes.
1) Modulation of the perceptual constraint: The perceptual constraint usually leads to a modulation by a local gain control
of the watermark strength. A more realistic embedding formula is then Eq. (29).
rw[k] = ro[k] + g[k].w[k] with g =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
g[k] (29)
This impacts on the expected spectrum under hypothesis H1.
S1(f) = σ
2
ro
+ Seg(f) ⊗ |H(f)|2 ∀f ∈ (−
1
2
,
1
2
] (30)
where Seg(f) is the Fourier transform of the auto-correlation function of the vector g̃. Thanks to the whitening action of the
pseudo-random permutation, this vector is assumed to be white, so that:
Seg(f) = σ
2
g + g
2δ(f) ∀f ∈ (−1
2
,
1
2
] (31)
Finally, we have:
S1(f) = σ
2
ro
+ σ2g + g
2|H(f)|2 ∀f ∈ (−1
2
,
1
2
] (32)
The conclusion is that the pseudo random permutation boils out the impact of the perceptual modulation. We only have to
know the average watermark strength g.
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2) Composite alternative hypothesis: The knowledge of gain g is a very important issue that surprisingly received very little
attention in the watermarking community. Indeed, up to know, the detection algorithm is always based on a simple hypothesis
test as described in III-C.1. This assumption is not realistic: there exist contents which do not bear much watermark strength
(e.g. the image ‘peppers’ with lot of uniform areas) and others which are less sensitive to watermark embedding (e.g. the
image ‘baboon’ with lot of textured areas). Hence, it is not realistic to pretend that the average watermark strength is the same
for all contents. Practical detection algorithms should thus be one sided tests: H0 : g = 0 versus H1 : g > 0.
This reality may not be a problem in the DSSS method. In Eq. (1), neither the sufficient statistic (a linear correlation), nor
the threshold (fixed under H0) depends on the parameter g. On the opposite, in the asymmetric method, the test is defined
only for a given g. In other words, whereas in DSSS, a Uniform Most Powerful test may exist [38] ; in the asymmetric case,
it is not possible to find one.
As an illustration of this issue, we distinguish, from now on, the real watermark strength ge applied at the embedding stage
from gd expected at the detection side. Define γ = (gd/ge)
2. The functions µH0(γ), µH1(γ) and the calculated threshold
T (ge, ω) are drawn on Fig. 3. It illustrates what happens if we apply the simple hypothesis test strategy: a fixed threshold is
calculated for a given gd, e.g. gd = E{ge}. We note that when ge 6= gd, the test is likely to find a watermarked content except
if γ & 2.4, where the expectation of the tested statistic falls below the threshold. It means that contents that have received a
small amount of watermark energy will never be detected. On the other hand, if the detector has access to the value of ge, the
statistic is compared to the adaptive threshold T (ge, ω), and watermarked contents are more likely to be detected whatever the
embedding strength.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
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1
    
adaptive threshold
fixed threshold   
γ
Fig. 3. Mismatch between the watermarking strength ge used at the embedding side and its expectation gd at the detection side. The mean of the tested
statistic is plot for both hypotheses. The test is more powerful locally when the mean under H1 is maximum, i.e. gd ∼ ge. If gd > ge the likelihood that the
content is watermarked decreases.
Some solutions to this problem are proposed below:
• Ď1: Estimate the pdf pGe(.) of the parameter ge from a huge amount of contents. The detection uses a Neyman-Pearson
test with the parameter gd that maximises the expectation of the power function:
gd = arg max
g>0
Pde(g) (33)
with
Pde(g) =
∫ ∞
0
Pde(ge, g)pGe(ge)dge (34)
This is not an easy task as the threshold also depends on the parameter gd. This test is only optimal when ge = gd, i.e. there
exist other tests more powerful locally. But, Ď1 globally maximises the power of the test.
• Ď2: Build a test not depending on this parameter and optimal when the two hypothesis are hardly distinguishable, i.e.
g & 0. This is a Locally Most Powerful test near the frontier of the two hypothesis. It is well known that this test has the
structure of the Neyman-Pearson decision rule where the tested statistic is replaced by its derivative with respect to θ = g2
calculated for θ = 0 [38]. In our case, the test becomes:
Ď2(ru) =
{
1 if D2(i) =
∑n
k=1
(
IN (f [k])
σ2ru
− 1
)
(|H(f [k])|2 − 1) > T2(ω)
0 else
(35)
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• Ď3: Take advantage of the side information available at the detection stage. Using in the detector the same perceptual model
as the embedding stage provides an estimate of the watermark strength. We are then back to a simple alternative hypothesis,
conditioned for each received content by the side information about the estimated embedding strength.
• Ď4: Use a generalised Neyman-Pearson test [38]. Another way to determine the strength ge is to use a maximum likelihood
estimator, i.e. ĝe is the parameter maximising the log likelihood:
ĝe = arg max
g>0
log p(i|H1, g) (36)
Then, the classical Neyman-Pearson test is proceeded. This is equivalent to the following decision rule:
Ď4(ru) =
{
1 if D4(i) = maxg>0 D(i, g) > T4(ω)
0 else
(37)
Whereas the first two tests share the same complexity with the previous one for simple hypotheses, the last two decision
rules require more computing power. Ď3 needs the implementation of the perceptual model used at the embedding stage. Ď4
needs a gradient algorithm to find the maximum of the log likelihood ratio.
3) Asymptotic optimality: Having already assumed that N goes to infinity, the four previous tests are compared by their
asymptotic performances. Define Γθ the Fisher’s information with respect to parameter θ
Γθ = lim
N→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
(
∂
∂θ
S1(f [k])
)2
, (38)
and ∆N,θ the following random variable:
∆N,θ =
1√
n
n∑
k=1
IN (f [k]) − S1(f [k])
S1(f [k])
∂
∂θ
S1(f [k]). (39)
∆N,θ is proved to be asymptotically distributed as a Gaussian with variance Γθ. Dzhaparidze names the Rao test the following
one in the chapter IV of [39]:
ĎR(ru) =
{
1 if DR(i) = Γ
−1/2
0 ∆N,0 > TR(ω)
0 else
(40)
Moreover, he proves this test possesses asymptotically the best average power among all decision rules with a level of false
alarm ω. This shows ĎR is asymptotically equivalent to Ď1. It is also asymptotically equivalent to the test Ď4 as stipulated
in [39] because:
1
n
D4(i) − ∆N,0Γ−10 ∆N,0
N→∞→ 0 in probability. (41)
Finally, developing expression of Eq. (40), we notice that the decision rule ĎR and Ď2 are indeed based on proportional
statistics.
The asymptotic properties of the Rao test allow us to conclude that the tests Ď1, Ď2 and Ď4 are equivalent as N goes large.
The test Ď2 will be preferred, as it requires less computing power. Moreover, it has asymptotically the best average power;
hence, it outperforms test Ď3.
4) Non Gaussian distributed vectors: In the real world, the extracted vectors are not Gaussian distributed. This pulls down
our previous analysis for this simple reason: Eq. (18) no longer holds and the periodograms at Fourier frequencies are not
independent anymore. According to the proposition 10.3.2 of [40], the periodograms at frequencies 0 < fa < fb < N̄ have
the following properties.
var(IN (fa)) = σ
4
ro +
κ4(ro)
N
(42)
cov(IN (fa), IN (fb)) =
κ4(ro)
N
(43)
The fourth cumulant κ4(ro) is null for the Gaussian distribution, but not necessarily so in the general case: the periodograms are
still unbiased estimators of spectrum of non Gaussian time series, but their variance increases. Especially, the periodograms are
not independent. Our rationale is still valid if we consider the vector i = (IN (f1), . . . , IN (fNb))
T of fixed length Nb and when
N → ∞. It means that periodograms for a fixed number of bins are asymptotically independent. But, the interpretation of the
Whittle principal part in III-C.2 is no longer true if we consider the statistic defined in Eq. (21) i = (IN (f [1]), . . . , IN (f [N/2−
1]))T . Yet, we will still study it although we can not justify its use. Changes appear then in the expressions of σH0 and σH1 .
For instance, let us compare the standard deviation σH0,(NG) in the non Gaussian case with σH0,(G) in the Gaussian case:
σ2H0,(NG)
σ2H0,(G)
= 1 + 2K4(ro)G
2
∫ 1/2
−1/2
|H(f)|4df + o(G2) (44)
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where K4(ro) is the kurtosis of the random process ro in the non Gaussian case. This increase is relatively small and does
not spoil our previous tests.
A much harder issue is the asymptotic Gaussianity of the statistics used in the four proposed tests when the extracted vectors
are not Gaussian. As this implies complex mathematical tools far beyond the scope of this paper, we discard any sketch of
proof and invite the reader to see theorems developed in the following references. The major argument is that, under hypothesis
H0, these decision rules are based on linear functionals of periodograms of white noise. This is directly related to the works
of G. Fay [41], who proved the asymptotic Gaussianity and consistence of linear and non-linear functionals of white or linear
random processes. Yet, under hypothesis H1, the watermarked signal is not a linear random process. Nevertheless, the filter
h has a non-singular frequency response and the watermark strength is so small, that we can assume the random process is
almost white. Moreover, the consistency of our method under real conditions was experimentally assessed in [33].
IV. SECURITY ASSESSMENT
A. Relationship with Cryptography
To introduce our analysis, we would like to establish some comparisons with basic concepts from cryptography.
1) One way function: At the embedding stage, the secret key is the set of the following parameters {v,h, ̟}, whereas
the detection key is composed of {|H(f [k])|2, ̟−1}. Hence, there exits a one way function deriving the detection key from
the embedding key. This implies that the detector works yet without knowing what signal has been added to the content.
The use of such a one way function has been firstly mentioned by Diffie and Hellman as mandatory to achieve asymmetric
crypto-systems [14]. Later on, this concept led to the famous RSA algorithm, where the non-inversion of the one way function
is based on the hard mathematical problem of factoring large integers in prime numbers. Somehow, the only thing we did is
to find a one way function from the signal processing field and to derive a simple watermarking scheme on this basis.
In the same way, the parameter v of Eq. (11) can be seen as a trapdoor [14]. It is possible to recover the original content
Co from its watermarked version if and only if this trapdoor is known. Yet, remember that the recovery of Co is not the goal
of the pirates. All they need is a content that looks like the distributed content and deludes the detectors. It is possible that
such a pirated content could be forged only knowing the detection key. This rises far more concerns as this key is stored in
millions of consumer electronic devices.
In other words, whereas asymmetric schemes mean public key crypto-systems in cryptography, this implication is not true in
the watermarking field. The detection key is to remain secret. As far as we know, there is no, so far, public key watermarking
primitives. This highly desired primitive, if existing, is an asymmetric scheme where it is proved that the knowledge of the
detection key can not help the pirates to forge a convenient content. This is not the case in actual asymmetric techniques. We
produced in [30] an attack available if the detection key is disclosed. This attack threatens all methods unified in this later
paper. Thus, the alternative solution we proposed is defenceless against the reverse engineering threat listed in section II-C.
2) Role of the pseudo-random permutation: The role of the permutation is extremely important. Of course, if the extracted
vectors are not white processes, its presence is mandatory to whiten them and to make the detection algorithm work. But, this
permutation has also a role from a security point of view. It hides in what space the detection algorithm takes place. Without
its knowledge, a dishonest user can not predict the impact of his attacks on the detection output. The permutation maintains
the pirate in a blindness state, where all he can do is to modify the extracted vector and to hope that this will flip the detection
output.
Let us denote rp the extracted vector of the pirated content. We assume that the attack can be modelled by the addition of
an independent signal p: rp = rw + p. The crucial question is the impact of the vector p̃ on the decision rule. It is likely
that this permuted vector is also white, so that it just lowers the watermark to content power ratio to G = g2/(σ2ro + σ
2
p).
Because the attack must conserve the quality of the content, it decreases slightly the power ratio. J. Stern and J.-P. Tillich
investigated the probability that the attack escapes to this likely whitening action of the permutation [28], [42]. They showed
that for a given attack vector p and a given watermarked content rw, the set of the permutations that will give a successful
hack is extremely narrow, i.e. its size decreases exponentially as N goes large. It results in an exponentially small probability
of a successful hack from a blind attack.
The use of pseudo-random permutation is a common thing in cryptography in order to hide the space where cipher texts
decryption is feasible. The public key crypto-system of McEliece is such an example [37].
B. Malicious Attacks
We can not pretend that the dishonest user will just blindly attack the contents. As described in section II-C, he will certainly
try to gain some information about the secret parameters from a huge amount of protected contents and from the detection
black box implemented in devices. This section gives credits to the asymmetric methods proving their superiority against these
malicious attacks.
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1) Attacks on protected contents: Of course, the ‘average attack’ spotted in section II-C is not anymore valid because of
the randomised embedding action of vector v. The aim of the pirate is to gain information about the permutation ̟. This is
the most important secret parameter as it gives access to the ‘detection space’.
The only way is to manage a brute force attack where the pirate tries all permutations. His issue is then to know whether he
has found a suitable permutation. He can not perform the detection as {|H(f [k])|2}, a secret parameter, is missing. A possibility
is to build a detector that distinguishes a white noise from a coloured noise, whatever its spectrum’s shape. K.Drouiche and
G.Fay have recently improved prior art of such a detector proposing the following statistic [41]:
ℵ = log σ2rw −
1
KN
KN−1∑
k=1
log(IN (f [k])) (45)
where IN (f [k]) is the pooled periodogram over p consecutive bins. p > 4 and KN = N/2p − 1 (we assumed N ∈ 2pN).
The deflection coefficient of this test, in our framework, is proportional to G2
√
N . This poor efficiency disables a practical
implementation of this watermarked content only attack. Nevertheless, this strategy is possible with a known cover content
attack as the original signal can be removed.
The set of the permutations is, a priori, composed of N ! elements. For instance, if N = 2048, using Sterling’s formula,
N ! ∼ 219000. This outnumbers the particles in the universe (∼ 2270). On the other hand, not all permutations are suitable. ̟
must have an extremely good scrambling property to whiten the signals. In the same way, the pirate does not have to find the
exact permutation but one sufficiently close to ̟. To better assess the security level against this attack, we suppose that the pirate
knows what pseudo-random permutation generator we used. Its seed is a binary sequence of length L ≪ N . It is assumed that all
these permutations have a sufficient whitening action and that they are independent. Hence, the brute force attack is reduced to
a figure of 2L tries. Imagine that one try (creation of one permutation, interleaving the vector, periodogram calculus and finally
the Drouiche test) lasts 1µs. Then, the pirate is likely to find the permutation ̟ in 2(L−log2(10
6∗60∗60∗24∗365)−1) ∼ 2L−46
years. Of course, this is a raw estimation of the security level. The pirates may use several computers in parallel and the
Moore’s law is not taken into account.
2) Attacks on the detector: The dishonest user is testing the detector feeding it with faked chosen contents. The first difficulty
is that he does not have access to the tested statistic but to its binary comparison with the threshold. Hence, he does not always
know if its attack has decreased the tested statistic. To overcome this difficulty, T. Kalker proposed to render the detector
sensitive, i.e. to feed it with faked contents whose statistics are close to the threshold. This is the reason why this attack
is also called the ‘sensitivity attack’. Doing this, slight changes in the content are likely to flip the detector output, giving
information about the detection key. This strategy is efficient with the DSSS method. An estimation of a secret key of length
N is determined within O(N) tries. The pirate removes this estimated signal to the extracted vectors of contents to be forged
as in Eq.(9). This not exactly results in the original contents, but in good quality forged contents.
This oracle attack does not work so well with this asymmetric method. The first step is to produce vectors whose impact
on the detection are known to be negative (i.e. they decrease the tested statistic). Let us create two extracted vectors families
{ei,j} and {ei,j} so that ei,j [k] = δ[k− i] + δ[k− j] and ei,j [k] = δ[k− i]− δ[k− j]. We require that i 6= j, thus, each family
contains N(N − 1) elements. Both families are closed with respect to the permutation ̟(.):
ẽi,j = e̟(i),̟(j) (46)
ẽi,j = e̟(i),̟(j) (47)
Their corresponding periodograms are:
Igei,j (f [k]) =
2
N
(1 + cos 2π(̟(i) − ̟(j))f [k]) (48)
Igei,j (f [k]) =
2
N
(1 − cos 2π(̟(i) − ̟(j))f [k]) (49)
The pirate feeds the detector with a faked content whose extracted vector is r = aei,j . We assume the detection rule is Ď2.
Then, the sufficient statistic is proportional to one of the coefficients {cv} of the Fourier series of the sequence {|H(f [k])|2}:
D2(i) =
n∑
k=1
(
NIgei,j (f [k])a
2
a2σ2ei,j
− 1
)
(|H(f [k])|2 − 1) (50)
=
n∑
k=1
|H(f [k])|2 cos 2π(̟(i) − ̟(j))f [k] (51)
= Ncv with v = ̟(i) − ̟(j) (52)
If aei,j (or aei,j) sets the detector output to one, then it means that cv > T (ω)/N (respectively cv < −T (ω)/N ). If it’s not
doing so, then the pirate doesn’t know the influence of the couple of indices (i, j) in the detection process. If there is such a
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coefficient cv > T (ω)/N , then there are N couples (i, j) increasing the detection output that the pirate can find. These are all
the couples such that v = mod(̟(i) − ̟(j), N).
Denote Nu the number of Fourier series coefficients such that |cv| > T (ω)/N . The pirate has NNu couples of samples’
indices to be modified in order to decrease the tested statistic D. The main problem is that the periodogram clearly is a non
linear function of the samples {rw[k]}. For instance, adding the vector p = aei,j to rw modifies the tested statistic as follows:
D2(rp) ∼ D2(rw) −
2a2
σ2rw
cv + D
′
2 (53)
where D′2 is the term for the interference between rw and aei,j :
D′2 =
2a
σ2rw
n∑
k=1
|H(f [k])|2
√
IN (f [k])Igei,j (f [k]) cos(φfrw(f [k]) − π(̟(i) + ̟(j))f [k]) (54)
φfrw(f [k]) being the angle of the Fourier transform of r̃w at the frequency f [k]. The pirate can not predict this interference
term. It clearly depends on the watermarked content he aims to pirate. Its expectation is null, but its variance is proportional
to 4a2/σ2rw . This term sometimes helps him in his forgery, sometimes it has the opposite effect. Adding some other vectors
aei,j strengthens his attack, but also the interference term. Finally, the pirate can not predict how many tries are needed to
forge a given protected content.
In conclusion, it is recommended to design the template {|H(f [k])|2} so that most of its Fourier series coefficients are lower
than T (ω)/N . At least, the pirate needs O(N2) tries to retrieve all the available information. This is not considered as a good
security level in cryptography because the attack takes a polynomial time. We would have clearly preferred an exponential time
as in the previous section. But, it is often required in copy protection that the detector takes a decision every 10 seconds. Let
us suppose that N = 214 and that the pirate can not speed up the detection process. For DSSS, O(N) tries take almost 2 days.
For asymmetric schemes, O(N2) tries takes 85 years! Once again, this is a raw estimation of the security level. The pirates
may use several detectors in parallel. Moreover, once this preliminary step is completed, the attack is a random processing
which succeeds after an unknown number of tries, due to the interference term between rw and p.
V. SIMULATIONS
Our simulations are proceeded on still grayscale images of size 512 × 512 pixels and 8 bits by pixel. The media space is
the spatial domain.
A. Details about the technique
In this subsection, we give the details about the implementation of the DSSS technique invented by A. De Rosa and al.
[36]. Its robustness is impressive, especially with the optimal version of the detector [43].
X(.) orders in vector ro a subset of the magnitude of N discrete Fourier transform coefficients of Co. These coefficients
are extracted between the k-th and the (k + n)-th diagonal in the first quadrant and their symmetrical images in the second
quadrant [36]. The mixing function modifies the amplitude of the DFT coefficients store in ro proportionally to their value:
rw[k] = ro[k](1 + gw[k]) ∀k ∈ {0..N − 1} (55)
where g > 0 fixes the embedding strength. If w[k] < −1g , then rw[k] is clipped to 0.
The inverse extraction function copies the DFT coefficients of Co and changes the amplitude of those used at the extraction
according to the watermarked vector rw. It also changes the DFT coefficients of the negatives frequency bins with respect to
the symmetry property in order to recover a real array when the IDFT is taken. At last, it quantifies the real array into pixels
values in {0, . . . , 255}.
B. Human perception model
The watermark’s invisibility issue is only tackled by the embedding depth g. But, this action is very limited because the
watermark signal, once mapped in the media space, is spread all over the image. Uniform areas of the image are very sensitive
to watermark addition so that they only support extremely small embedding depth g, whereas edge areas, for instance, support
deeper watermark addition. This issue leads to a spatial domain based human perceptual model giving the amount of noise each
pixel can support. We selected the human perception model proposed in [43]. This empirical human perception model gives
good experimental results. It is based on the computation of the variance of the 9× 9 windowed signal and by normalising the
obtained arrays with respect to its maximum value. Thus, ∀(l, c) 0 ≤ M(l, c) ≤ 1. For better results, we limit the variances to
an upper limit and then normalise them:
M ′(l, c) =
{
var
(
Co(l − u, c − v) | (u, v) ∈ {−4, . . . , 4}2
)
if < M ′max
M ′max else
(56)
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M ′(l, c) is set to zero near the borders of the picture, i.e. if (l, c) ∈ {0, . . . , 3}2 ∪ ({L− 4, . . . , L− 1}× {C − 4, . . . , C − 1}),
before normalising: M = M ′/M ′max.
Finally, the watermarked content is given by a new inverse extraction function Y ′(.):
Cw = Y
′(rw, Co) = (1 − M) ⋆ Co + M ⋆ Y (rw, Co) (57)
where ⋆ is the pixel-wise product. The influence of this masking function is simply taken into account setting ge as follows:
ge = g
L−1,C−1∑
l=0,c=0
M(l, c)/LC
C. Receiver Operating Characteristic
Our first experiment is to use a large collection of pictures to estimate the distribution of ge, and then, to find the parameter
gd that maximises the test’s power. For N > 1024 and ω < 0.01, this happens for extremely small value of this parameter,
i.e. gd & 0. It means that the decision rule Ď1 turns out to be equivalent to the test Ď2 (cf. III-D.2), and by the way, to ĎR
(cf. III-D.3). This experiment confirms the Dzhaparidze’s theorem about the asymptotic optimality of the Rao test.
Our second experiment draws the experimental receiver operating characteristic of the tests Ď2, Ď3 and Ď4 on Fig. 4. We
set N = 214, g = 0.2, M ′max = 4000. We use 150 pictures to estimate the distribution of the tested statistics under hypothesis
H0, and we watermark 50 high quality pictures to estimate their distribution under H1. To increase the number of tries, we use
100 different pseudo-random permutations. Moreover, we also plot the characteristics of the decision rules Ď2 and Ď4 when
the watermark signal is repeated τ times (τ = 4 or 8). This results in new vector lengths N = 4096 or N = 2048.
The test Ď3 is less efficient than the other ones. This reflects the fact that the estimation of parameter ge at the detection stage
is not as easy as it seemed. Especially, if the watermarked content has undergone even a slight compression, this estimation
is biased due to the compression noise: such blind attacks, not only tend to decrease the watermark strength, but also, they
made ge overestimated. This pulls down the efficiency of the test conditioning. As stated by R. Blahut in [44], conditioning
a test improves its performance in average, but there might be special cases where it spoils its decision. For watermarking
techniques, these special cases correspond to common blind attacks, hence it is recommended to give up this test.
The tiling process, of course, increases the performances of the tests. But, we notice that for N = 2048, Ď2 is clearly less
efficient than Ď4. These two decision rules are asymptotically equivalent as N → ∞, i.e., in our experimental environment, if
N > 4096.
The benefit of the tiling processing has been proved only when N is large, as our rationale is based on asymptotic expressions.
It clearly means that the gain of the tiling is limited. A huge number of tiles means short vectors whose length is not large
enough to enable the statistical test correctly. Fig. 5 draws the power functions Pde of the tests Ď2 and Ď4 for two levels of
significance with respect to the number of tiles. For a small number of tiles, the gain of the tiling process is experimentally
verified. For bigger numbers of tiles, this gain can not compete with the loss of efficiency due to the non-asymptotical condition:
the power function is then decreasing. This clearly shows that, in our experimental environment, the minimum value of N is
2048, which implies a maximum of τ = 8 tiles.
The security criterion is also limiting the number of tiles. A too big number of tiles may enable the pirate to estimate the
watermark signal. But, the averaging process in the detector is computed on the permuted coefficients. Hence, the pirate does
not know how to average the coefficients to produce a good estimation of the watermark signal.
D. Robustness against a blind attack
We watermark 50 different pictures with 20 different permutations, and compress them with the JPEG algorithm for different
quality factor. The power of the test is estimated for two thresholds corresponding to two levels of significance: ω = 10−3
and ω = 10−4. Fig. 6 shows that the decision rules Ď2 and Ď4 face this blind attack in a similar way. This simulation is
far more meaningful than checking the presence of watermarking in one compressed image such as Lena. Even for very low
quality factor, the power of the test is not null. There exist contents where we can still detect the presence of the watermark.
We could have presented the same experience only with one of these contents pretending the technique is robust to JPEG
compression. This would have been of course absolutely not demonstrative. The power function brings far more information
about the robustness against the attack.
E. Attack on the detector
The last figure 7 is the result of the oracle attack described in subsection IV-B.2. It shows the number of couples of indices
that set the output of the detector to one. This number is given as a percentage of the N2 couples. The threshold is higher for
lower levels of significance. Hence, the lower is ω, the lower is the percentage. For practical use, ω is so small that the oracle
attack does not provide any information leakage of the secret detection key.
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VI. CONCLUSION
this article presents the concept of asymmetry in watermarking and it details one possible method. This method is versatile,
as it can be adapted to a large number of watermarking techniques based on DSSS. On the other hand, we only studied its
advantages in the copy protection framework. Our rationale was to describe the targeted application, to analyse the possible
threats, and then to estimate the complexity of each class of attacks. This defines the security level that the watermarking
technique provides to the global copy protection system.
To the best of our knowledge, a watermarked content only attack is not possible with this method whereas it is a real threat
for DSSS and WCS schemes. A known cover content attack requires a brute force attack of size O(2L), whereas a single pair
of watermarked / original content is theoretically enough to disclose the secret key in DSSS techniques. The oracle attack
needs O(N2) tries whereas T. Kalker proves O(N) tries are sufficient for DSSS techniques.
The prize to be paid is the larger length of the vectors: The asymmetric detectors need more complexity, more memory
and they accumulate a bigger amount of content in order to take a reliable decision. Our future works are the invention of
asymmetric schemes with better performances thanks to the side information at the embedding stage.
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Fig. 4. Receiver Operating Characteristic for three detection strategies. Ď3 is too sensitive to the quality of the contents. It gives poor performances. Ď2
and Ď4 have the same performances. We also tile the watermark signal in order to increase the power ratio G at the detection side. On the other hand, this
shortens the vectors whereas the tests were only assessed asymptotically.
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Fig. 5. Influence of the tiling process on power functions. The advantage of tiling is to increase the watermark to content power ratio G resulting in better
test powers. Its drawback is to shorten the vectors’ length so that the tests are no longer asymptotic. For this watermarking technique, a good trade-off is a
number of τ = 8 tiles.
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Fig. 6. Robustness against a JPEG compression. This figure gives the probability that watermarked contents, which have supported a JPEG compression
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of these couples for different numbers of tiles τ and different significance levels ω.
